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Elements of Effective Insider Trading Laws 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
While countries have been more than willing to regulate insider trading, it is an open 
question as to whether this has resulted in improvements for those markets. In 
particular, lawmakers have had to largely structure the legal regimes with little guidance 
as to what makes an effective insider trading law. We seek to address this by examining 
the aspects of a legal regime that result in reductions in information trading and trading 
costs. Employing a sample of 18 countries, we compare specific and quantifiable 
aspects of the legal regime with the measures of transactions costs in a sample of up to 
70 randomly selected companies per market. We find that stronger laws result in 
reductions in the cost of informed trading. Particularly, we find that broader laws, laws 
that employ financial rather than criminal damages, and laws that are enforced by strong 
public regulators perform best. These results should help to enlighten regulator attempts 
to create strong and effective insider trading laws.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The issue of whether or not insider trading should be regulated has been debated 
by academics for several decades. Arguments for and against insider trading regulations 
have mainly focused on the costs of insider trading (informed insiders can profit from 
uninformed outsiders) and its impact on informational efficiency (private information 
may not be reach the market if insiders are hindered in trading). The literature has more 
recently swung in favour of regulation based largely on studies of the impact of 
regulations. There have been several empirical studies suggesting that some form of 
insider trading regulation is desirable.    
To provide an answer to the question of whether insider trading regulations 
matter, Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) investigated the relationship between the 
existence and enforcement of insider trading laws and the cost of equity for all countries 
with financial markets. They find that although many countries have rules prohibiting 
insiders trading, it is only when these rules are enforced that they reduce the cost of 
equity. Beny (2005) extends the work of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) by considering 
different aspects of insider trading regulations and finds that: 1) stricter insider trading 
laws lead to more diffuse equity ownership, more accurate stock prices and increase 
market liquidity; and 2) sanctions that follow when breaking the rules have a more 
significant impact than the scope of the laws. While these studies address important 
issues regarding the efficacy of insider trading regulations, several important questions 
remain unanswered. First of all, are these regulations effective in reducing the amount 
of informational trading, and if so, what aspects of regulations are most effective? 
Second, do effective regulations decrease the direct costs (the bid-ask spread) investors 
incur when trading in financial markets? It is the aim of this paper to address these 
questions. 
To address the first question we investigate the relationship between insider 
trading laws and the probability of informed trading (PIN) as defined by Easley et al. 
(1996, 1997a, 1997b). If insiders constitute a sizeable portion of informed trades, then 
we expect that laws that prohibit insiders to trade on private information should result in 
a reduction in the probability of informed trading. Indeed, Durnev and Nain (2007) 
investigate the effectiveness of insider trading regulations and find that the existence 
and enforcement of regulations both decrease the amount of informational trading. 
However, we extend their work by investigating which aspects of insider trading 
regulations deter insiders most. 
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To address the second question, we consider the relationship between insider 
trading laws and various measures related to the cost of trading (spread). Market 
microstructure theory suggests that the bid-ask spread increases when informational 
asymmetry in a market is larger (Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Kyle, 1985) as the 
presence of superiorly informed traders introduces a risk of expropriation to less 
informed liquidity providers. When insider trading laws are lacking or are weak the 
trading of insiders may cause the bid-ask spread to widen. Indeed, Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998) show that spreads for a large sample of US firms are wider for 
companies with a greater extent of insider trading. In addition, Frijns, Gilbert and 
Tourani-Rad (2007) find that the bid-ask spread decreases significantly after a 
significant tightening in the insider trading regulations in New Zealand. Based on this 
theoretical and empirical evidence we investigate whether countries with specific 
elements in their insider trading regulations have a lower spread. To determine whether 
the relation between the spread and insider trading laws is driven by the reduction of 
insider trades, we also evaluate more specific measures that consider the cost of trading 
due to informational asymmetry.  
In this paper we extend the work of Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), Beny 
(2005) and Durnev and Nain (2007) in two important directions. Firstly, we go beyond 
simply looking at the general strength of insider trading laws, or their mere presence, to 
consider what aspects of the laws are important in creating an effective regime. That 
insider trading laws are considered important can be seen in the number of countries 
who have implemented laws, 87 out of 103 markets in 1998 (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 
2002). However, the literature does little to advise policy makers on the best structure, 
sanctions and enforcement methods to use. Beny (2005) makes a good first attempt at 
this by looking at the outcomes of different legal variables, however the measures 
looked at in that paper do not measure the impact on insiders. Additionally while 
Durnev and Nain (2007) look at the impact on informational trading, arguably 
dominated by insiders, they only consider the overall strength of the laws for each 
market. We examine a number of variables in relation to the laws within a country 
including the scope of the laws, the sanctions available and the methods and success of 
enforcement. We start with the legal variables defined in Beny (2005) but go into more 
depth particularly in relation to the sanctions available.  
Additionally we use a very different approach to examine the impacts on 
insiders. Firstly, we investigate the relationship between informed trading and laws by 
examining  the probability of informed trading as defined by Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 
 4
1997b). Given insiders make up a sizeable portion of informed traders, laws that impact 
on the freedom of insiders to trade on confidential information should result in a 
reduction in the probability of informed trading overall. In addition we also look at the 
impact on the trading costs within the country. Trading costs include a cost component 
designed to compensate liquidity providers for the losses they incur when trading 
against better informed parties such as insiders (Copeland and Galai, 1983; Glosten and 
Milgrom, 1985). In essence this measures both the probability of insider trading and the 
expected gains insiders making it a measure of the markets perception of insider 
prevalence and harm. We therefore examine the impact on trading costs in three ways; 
firstly, examining the overall impact on total spreads by looking at the percentage 
spreads; secondly, by examining the information asymmetry component of the spreads 
using Huang and Stoll (1996)’s realised spread measure; lastly, by decomposing the 
spreads to get the proportion of information asymmetry in the spread via the Madhaven, 
Richardson and Roomans (1996) bid-ask spread decomposition model. These measures 
provide a more robust framework for examining the impact of laws on insiders than the 
factors examined in Beny (2005). The relationship between laws and trading costs has 
also been determined by Eleswarapu and Venkataraman (2003), who established that 
where the laws are weak or ineffective in limiting insiders, the risk to liquidity providers 
is therefore much greater resulting in wider spreads than would occur in markets where 
the laws were effective or enforced.  
We examine a sample of 1073 companies from 18 countries for the period 
September 2004 to August 2005. Using country level averages for each of the 
dependent variables, we find limited support for the hypothesis that the overall strength 
and scope of insider trading laws positively affects the cost of information asymmetry in 
the market and the prevalence of insiders. However, we find strong support for the 
importance of well constructed sanctions. In particular we find that strong financial 
penalties that ensure that insiders are guaranteed not to profit, and preferably face a 
significant financial penalty that scales with the size of their trading are most effective 
in controlling insiders. We do not however find any support for criminal sanctions 
regardless of the length of the potential jail term or whether they have been successfully 
enforced. Further we find that enforcement strength is also a key aspect of an insider 
trading regime. Countries that have enforced laws have less informed trading as 
measured by the PIN model. In addition a strong public regulator appears essential in 
controlling insider trading while private enforcement has no value in controlling insider 
trading. This supports previous findings by Beny (2005) and also anecdotal evidence on 
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private prosecutions of insiders in countries like New Zealand and the United States. 
Our findings suggest that the laws do matter and that careful consideration needs to be 
given when constructing insider trading laws to incorporate those elements that will be 
most effective in controlling insider trading.  
Studies have shown that the construction of laws protecting investors from 
unscrupulous trading practises is important both generally and specifically with respect 
to insider trading. The law and finance literature in particular has examined how the 
quality of institutional settings affects the development of financial markets. La Porta et 
al., (hereafter LLSV) in a series of papers showed that numerous aspects of financial 
market development were dependent on effective and enforceable investor protection 
regimes. These included access to equity and debt capital (1997), share ownership 
concentration (1998), corporate valuations (1999) and ease of access to new equity 
capital from the public (2003). Further, a paper by Johnson et al., (2000) showed that 
variables such as investor protection and quality of law enforcement were related to the 
extent of market declines during periods of financial crisis. Providing a robust and 
accessible legal framework is vital in attracting international investment given the 
competition for capital amongst countries. Where investors can be taken advantage of 
via practises such as insider trading the result for the market is a reduction in investor 
confidence, an increase in the risk premiums associated with that market and ultimately 
a reduction in liquidity in the market. This is of particular concern for small markets in 
particular.  
While the evidence on the impact of insider trading laws on the market is much 
more limited, it tells a similar tale, namely that stronger and enforced laws reduce the 
impact of insiders on the market. Beny (2005) establishes that stronger laws are 
associated with higher liquidity, wider share ownership and increased price accuracy. In 
particular Beny concludes that deterrents are the most important formal legal factor 
affecting these aspects of the market, although enforcement is also vital. Garfinkel 
(1997) explores changes in the regulatory regime within the US following the 
enactment of tighter new laws. He concludes that significant changes in insider trading 
behaviour, including the timing around announcements, followed from the regulatory 
change, suggesting the impact from stronger laws is due to changes in insiders 
behaviour. Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) finds that reductions in the cost of capital 
require the laws to be enforced. In a later paper (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2005) they 
conclude that an inability to enforce results in a higher cost of capital than had a country 
not enacted insider trading laws at all. Bushman, Pitroski and Smith (2005), when 
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looking at analyst following within countries, find a slightly different outcome, with 
only developing and emerging markets requiring actual enforcement. Developed 
markets were found to be given the benefit of the doubt. This finding however is likely 
due to the high overall ratings for developed markets in terms of the quality and 
independence of legal systems 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides more details on 
the sample employed and the variables constructed in this paper. Section 3 presents 
summary statistics for the variables collected and presents the findings of the regression 
analysis. Section 4 concludes the paper and discusses the implications of our findings.  
 
2. Sample 
 
To analyse the importance of the various components of an insider trading 
regime, we selected 18 countries for which data on specific aspects of their insider 
trading regime was available and for which the primary financial market within each 
country is either a limit order book (LOB) or a dealer market (see Table 1 for an 
overview of the countries included in this study and their characteristics).1 Some of 
these markets run several systems in parallel, usually employing LOBs and dealer 
markets for the more liquid stocks and other systems, such as auctions, for less liquid 
stocks. In these markets we randomly selected 70 stocks of non-financial firms trading 
on the primary market, for which we then collect intra-day data to construct our 
dependent variables. Data related to insider trading regulations were obtained from 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), Beny (2005) and various other sources, and data on 
various control variables were collected. To ensure sufficient data was available for the 
estimation of the dependent variables we remove any firms that had less than 1000 
trades over the course of the sample period (the equivalent of approximately 4 trades per 
day). This reduced our final sample to 1,073 stocks or approximately 60 stocks per 
market.   
                                                 
1We restrict the sample to these market types as models we employ require the specific price setting 
mechanisms found in these market types.   
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2.1 Dependent Variables 
 
To explore the impact of various elements of insider trading laws on insider 
trading we examine the relationship between variables that measure or proxy the level 
of information asymmetry within the market and the prevalence of informed trading. To 
construct these measures we collected intra-day (tick-by-tick) transaction data for the 
period 1 September 2004 to 31 August 2005 from SIRCA.2 The transaction data contain 
detailed information about all trades including the transaction price, volume, time of the 
trade (to the nearest minute) and the best quotes at the time of the trade, as well as 
information on changes to the best bid and ask price over the course of the trading day.  
We consider various measures to determine whether the relationships we find 
are robust. First, we want to evaluate whether specific elements of insider trading lead 
to a reduction in the amount of insider trading. We use the probability of informed 
trading measure developed by Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b). This variable 
indicates the prevalence of informed trades, which includes insider trades. If laws in a 
country are more effective than in others we would observe less insider trading, 
resulting in reduced informed trading and therefore a lower PIN. Second, we want to 
address the question whether specific elements of insider trading laws affect the cost of 
trading. To investigate this issue we consider the percentage spreads (absolute spread 
divided by the midpoint of the bid and ask price). In addition, we consider spread 
measures more directly related to the informational asymmetry components of the 
spread. We use the realised spread measure as a model-free measure of the 
informational asymmetry component and we also examine the decomposed cost of 
information asymmetry as a proportion of the total spread in our analysis. This variable 
has the advantage of directly measuring market estimates of the harm of informed 
trading (of which insiders can make a substantial component). 
 
The Probability of Informed Trading 
We start by considering a measure for the amount of informed trading. The 
measure we consider is the probability of informed trading (PIN) as proposed by Easley 
                                                 
2Securities Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific. 
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et al. (1996, 1997a, 1997b). This measure essentially considers the intraday order flow, 
where the imbalance in daily order flow is used as an indicator for the amount of 
informational trading. The PIN is then defined as the number of informed trades relative 
to the number of uninformed trades. 
 To formalize, consider a market that consists of a certain number of informed 
and uninformed traders. On each day, uninformed traders trade for liquidity purposes 
and arrive to the market with an arrival rate ε. Informed traders will only be active on 
days when they receive a private signal. Let α be the probability that a private 
information signal arrives to the market on a given day. On such a day informed traders 
will be active with an arrival rate of µ. The signal can be bad news with probability δ 
and good news with probability (1 - δ). When the signal is bad news buy orders arrive at 
a rate of ε and sell orders arrive at a rate of µ + ε. When the signal is good news buy 
orders arrive at a rate of µ + ε and sell orders arrive at a rate of ε. Correspondingly, 
there is a probability of (1 - α) that no private news arrives, and on such a day buys and 
sells arrive at a rate of ε. The probability that a trade is executed by an informed trader 
is defined as 
 
εαµ
αµ
2+=PIN .              (1) 
 
If we assume that the order arrivals follow Poisson processes, the probability of 
observing a certain number of buy and sell orders is given by 
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where θ = (α, δ, ε, µ)’ is the vector of parameters. The first part on the right-hand side 
of the equation refers to probability of the day being a “good news” day, the second part 
refers to the probability of the day being a “bad news” day and the last part refers to a 
“no news” day. 
 Assuming that information events are random, i.e. events on different days occur 
independently of each other, the likelihood function can be expressed as the product of 
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each separate probability. The log likelihood function (excluding constants) can 
therefore be written as 
 
∑
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where M = min(B, S) + max(B, S)/2 and εµ
ε
+=x .  The usage of M and x in the 
likelihood function improves the computational efficiency in estimating the parameters. 
For a detailed discussion on the PIN model we refer to Easley et al. (1996, 1997a, 
1997b). 
 
Spread Measures and Informational Asymmetry 
The first measure we use to determine whether there is a relationship between 
insider trading regulations and trading costs is the percentage spread. The percentage 
spread is defined as the absolute spread divided by the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, 
i.e. 
 
2/)ba(
)ba(
Spread%
tt
tt
t +
−= ,        (4) 
 
where at and bt are the ask and bid prices, respectively. 
To determine more directly whether the reduction in spread is attributable to a 
reduction in informational asymmetry, we also consider the effective and realised 
spread (see e.g. Huang and Stoll, 1996). Huang and Stoll argue that the effective spread, 
the difference between the price at which a trade occurs and the midpoint of the spread, 
can be simply decomposed to get the information asymmetry component by looking at 
the post trade price changes. A dealer only profits if the prices reverse after a trade, such 
that the price rises after they purchase and decrease after they sell. However, when 
trading against informed parties the opposite will be the case, the price will fall after a 
purchase and increase after a sell, meaning that the dealer does not realise the effective 
spread. Huang and Stoll therefore examine the difference between the effective spread 
and the realised spread to estimate the cost of informed trading. The effective spread (zt) 
is estimated as  
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2/)( tttt bapz +−= ,     (5) 
 
where pt is the price at which the current trade occurs and at and bt are the respective ask 
and bid prices.  
From this effective spread the authors subtract the realised spread, which is 
defined as  
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For bid and ask quote, respectively, and where τ+tp  is the price of a trade at least τ 
minutes after the initial trade. In our case we use the lesser period employed in Huang 
and Stoll (1996) of 5 minutes, although we do not cap the period within which a trade 
must occurs. As noted in their paper 5-10 minutes resulted in similar results to simply 
greater than 5 minutes. We then divide the difference between the effective and realised 
spreads by the midpoint of the trade to get a percentage value that can be compared 
between different markets with different currencies and price levels.  
The last spread measure we consider is the proportion of the cost of information 
asymmetry to the total spread. We calculate this by employing a bid-ask spread 
decomposition model. Specifically, we apply the model proposed by Madhavan et al. 
(1997) as it has been used frequently when decomposing spreads in dealer markets and 
limit order book markets (see Ahn et al., 2002; Frijns et al., 2007 among others).  
The Madhavan et al. (1997) model is based on the assumption that trading prices 
are affected by two cost components: an informational component that reflects the 
amount of informational asymmetry in the market and a real cost component that 
reflects the costs of inventory imbalances and order processing costs. If no private 
information is present in a market then trades do not provide any new information about 
the true value of an asset. In that case, the bid and ask price will not move and the 
transaction price will bounce between bid and ask. However, if traders with private 
information are present, their trades carry new information about the true value of the 
asset. Consequently, when, say, an informed buy order arrives, this signals that the true 
value of the asset is higher than the quoted prices, which will lead to an increase in both 
bid and ask quotes. By dynamically relating the order flow to transaction price returns, 
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we can therefore determine the informational amount of trading, which equals the 
information asymmetry component of the spread. Specifically, Madhavan et al. (1997) 
model transaction price returns as 
 
 ttttttt uxxxxpp +−+−=− −−− )()( 111 φρθ ,    (7) 
 
 where pt is the transaction price at time t, xt is a trade indicator that equals 1 for 
buyer initiated trades, -1 for seller initiated trades and 0 for trades at the midpoint for a 
trade at time t,3 θ is the per share cost of information asymmetry, φ is the per share 
compensation for inventory holding and order processing costs, ρ is the first-order 
autocorrelation of the expected trade direction conditional on the previous trade and ut 
captures the impact of price discreteness and new public market-wide information 
releases. The model is estimated by GMM, which is a more robust estimation procedure 
compared to OLS when observations are non-normally distributed. 
Under this model the arrival of informed traders is announced by unexpected 
trades in a given direction and causes the market to adjust the fundamental value by θ. 
Larger price reactions as a result of surprises in the order flow occur where there is a 
greater likelihood of trading against an informed trader hence requiring larger 
compensation for the risk this poses. We use the proportion of information asymmetry 
in the spread to make the value relative and therefore comparable regardless of the price 
level or spread size. To determine the proportion of information asymmetry we 
calculate θ/(θ+φ) for each company. We use this value as the dependent variable rather 
than the cross-sectional estimates of θ as it offers an estimate of the importance of 
information asymmetry unaffected by the size of the spread itself. This is a more 
comparable measure as it accounts for differences in spreads as a result of differing 
price levels. Further this measure provides a relatively clear and direct method of 
observing the impact of legal structures as the values are based on the markets estimates 
                                                 
3As the data does not contain information on who initiated the trade, we calculate the trade indicator 
variable by comparing the quotes to the transaction price. If the price occurs above the midpoint of the 
quoted spread we identify the trade as buyer initiated while trades that occur below the midpoint are 
classed as seller initiated.  Trades that occur at the midpoint are left undetermined. Unlike Lee and Reedy 
(1991) we do not lag quotes to determine the trade indicator, because the majority of markets examined 
are electronic markets where the risk of quotes and trades being recorded in the wrong order are 
dramatically lower (see Sirri and Peterson, 2003).  
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of the threat of informed trading. We accumulate the individual company values to get a 
country average. 
 
Estimation Issues 
We regress these variables against a number of insider trading law and control variables. 
As the proportion of the spread composed of information asymmetry costs can only take 
values between zero and one we use a doubly censored Tobit model to estimate the 
model. For the percentage spread and percentage effective spread we employ standard 
ordinary least squares regression.  
 
2.2 Insider Trading Law Variables 
 
To identify the aspects of the legal system that promote an effective insider 
trading regime, i.e. one that reduces the cost of information asymmetry in the market, 
we initially collect data on the specific structure of the laws in each country based on 
the definitions from Beny (2005). Given the age of the initial data collected by Stamp 
and Walsh (1996) and used by Beny, we recollect the legal variables for each country to 
ensure that any changes to insider trading laws are accurately reflected in the 
regressions that we run.  
Beny identifies a number of variables that are potentially important in creating 
an effective legal regime which can be categorised into three broad areas, the scope of 
the laws, the sanctions available and the probability of enforcement. In addition to these 
variables there is also a general measure of the strength of the insider laws, IT Law 
which is the sum of the four dummy variables, namely the two covering the scope of the 
law, Tipping and Tippee, and the two covering the sanctions available, Criminal and 
Damages. The two scope variables were combined into a dummy to cover the breadth 
of the laws, Scope, as were the two sanction variables, Sanction. We utilise these 
variables with the exception of Tipping, a prohibition on passing confidential 
information to others, and Tippee, a prohibition on trading by those who receive 
confidential information. We exclude these two variables as they have been almost 
universally accepted, with only India and Japan not prohibiting both. We do explore 
Scope to see if broader laws are more important.  
 In terms of sanctions we explore two variables, Criminal, which is a dummy that 
equals 1 if criminal sanctions are available, and Damages, which is a dummy that 
equals 1 if any financial penalties can be in excess of the gain made or loss avoided. As 
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noted above we also explore a variable that is the sum of these two sanction measures, 
Sanction. In addition we explore the issue of penalties in more depth than has been 
previously.  
As has been noted in the literature the pre-emptive ability of laws is a function 
of the penalties available and the likelihood of being caught. Therefore the exact nature 
and level of any fine or jail term is an important component of the sanctions available. 
In relation to this we explore three aspects of the financial damages that can be imposed 
on a successfully prosecuted insider. The first is Disgorgement which is a dummy 
variable if the insider is automatically fined the gain made or loss avoided such that 
there is no benefit from their trading. The second is Fixed damages which is both a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if there is a fixed fine either by itself or in conjunction 
with other potential financial penalties. The third is Variable damages where the court 
can set a pecuniary penalty that is multiple of the gain made or loss avoided, i.e. an 
insider maybe fined 3 times the gain made or loss avoided. Some systems involve a 
mixture of all three where the court can ensure that the gain made or loss avoided is 
repaid in addition to pecuniary penalties of a fixed fine or a multiple of the insiders gain 
which ever is greater. In addition to dummies for the Fixed and Variable financial 
penalties we also look at how the severity of the penalties impacts the market by using 
the maximum possible penalty for both the fixed fine, converted into US$, and the 
variable penalites. Addition we go beyond looking at the mere presence of criminal 
sanctions to consider the maximum jail sentence available under the law, Criminal Max.  
The final element we examine is the importance of enforcement. For the rules to 
be effective in controlling insiders there must be a real threat of enforcement as 
indicated by Bushman et al. (2006), Beny (2005) and Bhattacharya and Daouk 
(2002,2006). However, few reliable measures of actual enforcement are available on a 
per country basis. To proxy the enforceability of insider trading laws we examine three 
measures, past enforcement (Enforced) and two measures proposed in Beny (2005), the 
strength of public (Public) and private (Private) enforcement within the country. We 
use the data collected by Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002) to measure whether a country 
has prosecuted an insider prior to 1998, either successfully or unsuccessfully and update 
it for any countries that hadn’t prosecuted by 1998, although we find no additions 
amongst the sample countries. Such actions should demonstrate a will to enforce insider 
trading and therefore effectively increase the probability of enforcement. The impact of 
enforcement on insiders has been shown in several papers where it was associated with 
a reduction in the country cost of capital (Battacharya and Daouk, 2002) and an increase 
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in analyst following (Bushman et al., 2005), both argued as indicating a reduction in the 
presence of insiders. Additionally however, a failure to prosecute has been shown by 
Bhattacharya and Daouk (2006) to result in a cost of capital that is higher than for those 
countries who didn’t regulate in the first place. It therefore appears that the public 
perception of the strength of insiders is intimately tied to the ability to prosecute 
insiders.  
We also examine the impact of a successful criminal prosecution of insider 
trading. Although some have argued that criminal sanctions are ineffective due to the 
difficulty of proving to the higher burden of proof that insider trading occurred, it may 
be that where prosecution has occurred, given the significantly harsher nature of the 
penalty, that this may significantly reduce insider trading activities. Using information 
available from securities regulators and business papers we create a dummy that is equal 
to 1 if an insider case has been successfully prosecuted.  
The measures of public and private enforcement strength are used to proxy the 
probability of an insider facing a prosecution. Where the ability of the public and 
private groups to enforce the laws is weak, the possibility of a prosecution is 
significantly reduced. The measure of public enforcement strength proposed by Beny 
(2005) is constructed based on information collected from La Porta et al. (2003). In that 
paper, information is collected via a survey of domestic lawyers regarding various 
aspects of the market supervisors. The aspects most relevant to insider trading 
enforcement are the attributes of the supervisor and their investigative power. La Porte 
et al. (2003) examine the supervisor attributes to quantify the independence, authority 
and focus of the organisation which they achieve by looking at four attributes; the 
independence of the appointment process, the process for firing key members of the 
supervisor, how focussed on securities markets the supervisor is, and the ability to 
regulate the security markets without legislative or executive interference. They take the 
mean of the four variables to come up with a measure of the supervisor attributes. La 
Porta et al. (2003) also examines the investigative powers of the supervisor by creating 
an index based on their ability to command documents from relevant parties and 
subpoena the testimony of witnesses when investigating breaches of securities law. We 
take the mean of these two values to create an index of the public enforcement power of 
supervisors as per Beny (2005).  
While the merits of public enforcement of securities law is well understood (the 
ability to investigate breaches including commanding documents and subpoenaing 
witnesses plus the ability to impose sanctions) the role of private enforcement is less 
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well understood. La Porta et al. (2003) argues for private enforcement based on private 
contracting, although real world evidence suggests it is ineffective (Bainbridge, 2000). 
We examine the role of private enforcement of insider trading by employing the 
measure established in Beny (2005). Private is the product of the right to enforce, a 
dummy that equals 1 if a private right to prosecute exists and 0 otherwise, and a 
measure of the efficiency of the judiciary. Obviously the private right can only be 
enforced if individuals have good access to the courts and the process is reliable and 
efficient. We use the Law and Order ratings from the International Country Risk Guide 
to measure of the efficiency of the judiciary.  
2.3 Control Variables 
 
To control for other determinants of the bid-ask spread and non-insider trading 
related causes of differences we include a number of control variables, although not all 
the variables tried were included in the regressions. Where variables didn’t add to the 
predictive power of the regressions we excluded them. Firstly, we control for 
differences in liquidity on the basis that larger firms tend to be subject to less insider 
trading activity (Lakonishok and Lee, 2001). We measured this in several ways 
including the average number of trades per day, the natural logarithm of the average of 
the local currency market capitalisation over the sample period adjusted daily to US 
dollars and the average volume traded. In the end trades per day had the most predictive 
power and dominated the other liquidity variables, as such this is the only variable that 
is included in the regressions.  
To examine the country level protection afforded to investors more generally we 
utilise the anti-self dealing measure devised by Djankov et al. (2007). Their measure 
based on legal rules for 2003 looks at how well the laws prevent self-dealing by 
directors via private enforcement measures. The authors argue that this measure does a 
better job than the previously advocated anti-director rights measure. As such we use 
this measure to control for general legal protections against expropriation.  
We also examine a number of governance factors at the country level. These 
cover a variety of aspects of how the country is run and was taken from the Corporate 
Governance Matters Survey (2007) done for the World Bank. The survey uses a number 
of sources to rate countries in six areas; Voice and Accountability, Political Stability, 
Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law and Control of Corruption. 
Of these only the Rule of Law didn’t improve the regressions, thus was left out. This is 
possibly due to the inclusion of the LLSV factor which may account for the strength of 
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the judicial system in a country. Of the other five, Voice covers the ability of citizens to 
participate in the selection of the government and rights such as free speech. Political 
Stability looks at the perceived likelihood of political destabilisation by unconstitutional 
or violent means. Government effectiveness measures the quality of the public and civil 
service, the autonomy of civil servants and the quality of policy formation and 
implementation. Regulatory Quality measures the ability of the country to construct and 
implement sound laws designed to promote private sector development. And Control of 
Corruption measures how prevalent corruption is within the system. All of these play a 
role in determining how risky an investment within a country is and therefore need to be 
accounted for.  
We also control for the effect of any price discreteness due to the imposition of 
minimum tick sizes by the market. We do this by determining the averaging minimum 
tick that applies to the firm at the time a trade occurs and dividing that tick size by the 
price. Although we find this, along with a dummy for the market system in place, do not 
add to the model and so are excluded from the regression results presented.  
Finally, we controlled for the origin of the legal system in each country. These 
could be classed into three groups, common law countries, French civil law and German 
civil law countries. Research by La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2003) and Beny (2002) has 
found that the institutional setting and the quality of investor protection within a country 
is related to the legal origin of the laws within that country. As a general rule the studies 
have shown that common law provides the best investor protection while French civil 
law offers the least protection.  
 
3. Results  
 
3.1 Summary Statistics.  
 
Table 1 gives summary statistics of the insider trading law variables employed 
and the legal origin of each country. The sample contains 10 Common law countries 
with 4 each for the French and German civil law countries. It should also be noted that 
the countries represented in the French and German civil law sub-samples are for the 
most part large and well developed markets. In terms of the specific components, 
virtually all countries prohibit both tipping and tippees from trading. Although 
interestingly Japan prohibited recipients of confidential information from trading, an 
action that is virtually impossible to detect, but did not stop insiders from passing on the 
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information initially. It is argued that if insiders are free to pass on information than 
may effectively ‘sell’ it rather than trade on it personally. Only India did not prohibit 
those who were passed confidential information from trading. As a result the averages 
by legal origin are similar for all three.  
In terms of sanctions imposed on insiders, half the sample countries have both 
some form of financial penalty guaranteed to be greater than the gain made or lose 
avoided and criminal sanctions.  Criminal penalties are common amongst the countries 
with insider trading being a criminal offence in 14 countries. Given the difficulty in 
proving breaches of insider trading laws and the higher burden of proof required which 
for criminal sanctions, it is an interesting finding that they are relied on to prevent 
insider trading so heavily. The difficulty of prosecuting is demonstrated however by the 
fact that only 7 countries have prosecuted insiders, half the countries with criminal 
sanctions compared with close to 80% for civil enforcement. Germanic law countries 
had the highest percentage with 3 out of the 4, while the French civil law countries 
failed to criminally prosecute at all. French Civil law countries seem to rely more 
heavily on financial damages with both the largest variable damages at 10 times for 
France and the highest average in US$ for fixed fines at 4.4 million. Germanic civil law 
countries on the other hand have only small fixed fines with an average of just 
$258,000. This would suggest a reliance on criminal penalties given the low level of 
damages is unlikely to be a significant deterrent. Automatic disgorgement is highest for 
common law countries at 60% of the countries, followed by French civil law and last 
with just one country Germanic civil law. There does seem to be differing emphasis’s 
on how to punish insiders, with French Civil law countries opting for financial penalties 
while Germanic civil law countries prefer criminal sanctions, however even here these 
countries offer on average less jail time than common law countries.  
In terms of the enforcement variables however the differences are much starker. 
The highest rate of past enforcement was again in French civil law countries where all 
the sample countries had enforced before 1998 followed by common law and German 
civil law countries at similar levels. However, civil law countries had significantly 
lower instances of private enforcement with just Taiwan allowing private prosecutions. 
The civil law countries also have much lower ratings for public enforcement power than 
common law countries, .72, .49 and .19, for common, French and German civil law 
countries respectively. Japan has the lowest public enforcement with a 0 rating while the 
US has the highest at 1. The results suggest that while virtually all countries (with the 
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exception of 3) have enforced insider trading, the greatest probability of enforcement 
occurs in common law countries where sanctions are also relatively harsh.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics on the cross-sectional variables employed in 
the paper. The market capitalisation in US$ shows the US had the largest market 
capitalisation followed by the United Kingdom and France with Greece and Singapore 
having the smallest market caps. The markets also demonstrate significantly different 
liquidity as demonstrated by the number of trades which ranged from 5469 for New 
Zealand to in excess of 300,000 for the United States, which is twice the average for the 
next largest markets the United Kingdom and France. We also observe that the 
percentage spreads and effective spreads have similar mean and medians suggesting an 
even distribution of the values. The lowest values are shown in the US with .16 and .12 
respectively while the country with the largest average percentage spreads is Singapore 
at 1.96% and the largest effective spreads occurred in Greece at 2.29%.   
Table 3 shows the correlation coefficients matrix for the continuous insider 
trading law variables. What we observe is that the Fixed fines are positively correlated 
with variable fines, suggesting that countries do not replace one with the other but will 
often use both (as observed in Table 1) and that where they have stronger fixed fines 
they also have stronger variables fines. Fixed is however used as a substitute for longer 
jail sentences although the relationship is not particularly strong. Of note is the negative 
relationship, although weak, relationship between the strength of private enforcement 
and the variable and fixed damage levels. This suggests that insiders face lesser 
punishments in the presence of private enforcement. This is difficult to reconcile 
especially in relation to the positive relationship between public enforcement and the 
damages variables. A negative relationship suggests that regulators believe private 
enforcement increases the likelihood of prosecution and as such lower punishments. 
However, Beny (2005) in particular shows that private enforcement has little value in 
control insiders. Public regulators on the other hand were shown to be important. The 
positive relationship we show suggests that stronger sanctions are available with 
stronger regulators. One would expect a negative relationship as countries with weaker 
regulators attempt to correct for that by increasing the punishment given deterrence is a 
function of both the likelihood of prosecution and the likely punishment. We also find a 
positive relationship between the private and public variables. This indicates that 
stronger private enforcement is also found in countries with stronger public regulators.  
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3.2 Impact on Informed Trading 
 
We start our examination of the impact of insider trading regulations by 
examining the question of what effect do laws, and specific elements of the laws, have 
on the prevalence of informed trading within a market. Given the basis of regulating 
insider trading is to prevent insiders trading when in possession of confidential 
information not yet available to the market, it is appropriate to gauge the efficacy of the 
rules by examining how prevalent insiders are. Durnev and  Nain (2007) examine this 
issue by employing a measure of the overall strength of the insider trading regime 
against the volume-induced return autocorrelation observed. They argued that when 
prices and volume moved together it was evidence of informational trading. We employ 
a different model, namely the probability of informed trading model developed in 
Easley et al. (1996). This measure gives an estimate on the probability that a particular 
trade is executed by an informed trader, a group that includes insiders. Provided insiders 
make up a significant portion of the informed traders then any regulatory impact on 
their trading will flow through to the PIN estimate. Overall, based on the results in 
Tables 4 and 5 we find that laws can have a significant impact on the probability of 
informed trading within a market.  
The base case findings confirm our expectations about the direction of the 
control variables although the variables are typically insignificant. As can be seen the 
measure for liquidity, Trades per Day, is negative with mixed significance indicating 
that more liquid firms have less informed trading generally. This fits with previous 
literature which has argued that in less liquid and smaller firms insiders make up a 
greater percentage of traders and as a result drive up trading costs. We find similar 
results when using log market capitalisation and volume although these proved to add 
little to the model in the presence of Trades/Day. We also find that Anti-self Dealing is 
negative although insignificant. This would indicate that stronger investor protection in 
general has a negative influence on trading costs and informed trading. As expected 
both French civil law and Germanic civil law countries do a poorer job in reducing the 
prevalence of insiders, although only the dummy for French civil law countries is 
significant. This supports the findings of both LLSV and Beny who have all found that 
these regimes offer weaker investor protector rules overall.  
Of the survey based variables we see that both Corrupt and Gov Effect are 
negative although insignificant, while Reg Qual and Voice are negative and significant. 
This indicates that countries where regulatory effects generally result in more sound 
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legislation that the prevalence of informed trading decreases. This is likely a result of 
the increased likelihood of prosecution in such markets given that laws will generally be 
more enforceable if they are well constructed. The negative relationship for Voice is 
likely due to the increased accountability in markets with stronger freedom of speech. 
The significant and positive relationship between political stability and the probability 
of informed trading is hard to explain given markets with greater political stability 
should be more likely to have strong enforcement mechanisms.  
Table 4 also presents the results for the IT Law variable which is a measure of 
the overall strength of the laws themselves within the country. As is shown, with our 
sample the results are in the right direction, namely a negative relationship between the 
strength of the laws and the prevalence of informed traders, however the relationship is 
not significant. This maybe a result of the composition of our sample that is largely 
dominated by developed markets with little variation in the IT Law proxy. We also 
obtain a similar result for the Scope variable, a sub-index constructed by adding the two 
dummies Tipping and Tippee together, again most likely due to the lack of variation in 
the variable. Only two countries did not have rules that prohibited the passing of 
confidential information or prevented the recipient from trading on it, namely India and 
Japan. While both had relatively high probability of informed trading, the uniformity of 
the other countries in terms of the presence of these variables, makes it difficult to 
confirm the importance of broader laws definitively. The direction of both variables is 
however in the direction expected.  
The results for the penalties employed reveal some intriguing findings. Sanction 
is a sub-index created by adding the dummies for Criminal and Damages together 
designed to measure the overall strength of the available sanctions.  Given that insider 
trading is a difficult crime to detect it is widely argued that you need stronger sanctions 
to act as an effective deterrent to insiders. As expected we find a negative relationship 
between Sanctions and the PIN values. Interestingly when we break the sanctions out 
into the components, Damages, a dummy that equals 1 if insiders are liable for fines in 
excess of their profit, and Criminal, a dummy that equals 1 if criminal sanctions are 
available for insider trading, it is the lesser sanction that drives a reduction in the 
probability of informed trading. Criminal sanctions, which revolve around incarceration 
and jail time along with non-judicial punishments that follow from a criminal record, 
are argued to be the more severe sanctions that can be imposed. However, the 
regressions indicate that criminal sanctions not only do not cause a significant reduction 
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in informed trading, but are nearly significantly positive. The presence of financial 
damages on the other hand results in a significant reduction in insider trading.  
The finding that criminal damages are largely ineffective in reducing the level of 
insider trading is interesting given its popularity as a sanction but not totally surprising. 
Insider trading is a largely inferential crime relying on evidence of trading in 
conjunction with confidential price sensitive information to create a circumstantial link 
between the trading and information and thus establish illegality. This works fine for 
civil proceedings where the burden of proof is merely that it was more likely that they 
traded on the information than not. However, a criminal proceeding occurs at a much 
higher burden of proof that would be difficult to meet given the circumstantial nature of 
the evidence. If criminal sanctions are difficult to achieve and are not tied to effective 
financial penalties in excess of the profit gain or loss avoided, as is the case with some 
of the sample countries, then the laws efficacy is largely negated as there is no effective 
deterrent. In fact only 7 of the sample countries have criminal prosecuted an insider and 
of those only a couple appear to have done so regularly. Damages, on the other hand, 
while not as extreme as the available penalties under a criminal prosecution are far more 
widely available due to the lower burden of proof and therefore act as a more realistic 
penalty that can be applied more frequently. This is likely the reason behind significant 
changes in the composition of sanctions. Only 5 of our sample countries in this study 
had implemented financial penalties in excess of the gain made or loss avoided in Beny 
(2005). That has increased significantly in this paper with most countries running 
disgorgement of profits in addition to either a fixed fine or a fine based on a multiple of 
the gain made or loss avoided. 
When we break the damages out further in Table 5 we find some interesting 
results. Firstly when we look at the three categories of damages, disgorgement of 
profits, a fixed level fine and a variable level fine we see that a fixed fine is of limited 
use. The regression coefficient is positive but insignificant while disgorgement is at 
least negative but still insignificant. What appears to drive the reduction in probability 
of informed trading observed in the results in Table 4 are variable damages. Given 
deterrence is argued as being a function of the probability of being caught multiplied by 
the potential sanctions. Disgorgement results in stripping an insider of their profitability, 
and arguably by itself is not a sufficient deterrent to insider trading due to the fact that 
not all insider trading is caught. Any regime offering only disgorgement would not 
make the expected cost of insider trading outweigh the benefits. However, disgorgement 
offers a guarantee that any caught insider will not benefit from their actions, where as a 
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fixed fine has the potential to be less than the profit made. Hence the strongest reaction 
appears to be for variable damages which guarantee disgorgement plus a significant 
penalty on top. Under such a regime there is no way that insiders can avoid losing more 
than they gained from the trading.  
When the actual level of the sanctions available is examined the impact on the 
prevalence of insiders again shows that insiders are most deterred when the potential 
sanctions are greater. Larger variable damages result in a significant reduction in the  
prevalence of informed trading. This indicates that markets such as the UK where the 
maximum fine is unlimited and France where the maximum variable fine is ten times 
the gain made or loss avoided are likely to be more effective in controlling insiders. By 
contrast, the size of the fixed fine does result in a negative relationship with all three 
measures, however it is not significant in any of the regressions. This suggests that the 
level of the fine is of limited usefulness in controlling insiders. In fact it maybe counter 
productive as it may encourage insiders to trade heavily to ensure that the profits they 
earn outstrip any potential fine. This is particularly true for a country like Australia 
where there is only a fixed fine of $200,000 for individuals and no automatic 
disgorgement of profits. In this case it maybe possible to overcome the fine by trading 
heavily.  
The last sanction variable we consider is the Criminal Max in terms of the 
number of years a prosecuted insider can be jailed for. In most countries this is not the 
actual jail time that an offender will serve but it does make a useful proxy for the 
severity of the criminal sanctions. Criminal penalties differ greatly between the sample 
countries from 1 year in Belgium to 10 years in Hong Kong. However, the coefficients 
indicate that longer potential sentences reduced the prevalence of informed trading. In 
fact we actually find that longer criminal sentences have a significantly positive impact 
on the prevalence of informed trading, the direct opposite outcome expected if criminal 
sanctions were effective. The results therefore suggest that criminal sanctions are not 
perceived as an effective deterrent by insiders, who by and large seem to discount these 
when trading.  
The sanction results indicate that insiders main concern when trading is the 
potential losses they may face if they are caught. Fixed limit losses that may not cover 
the gains made appear to do little to limit the prevalence of their trading. Larger fines do 
have a limited impact but only in so much as it becomes harder to earn sufficient profits 
to cover any fine. Variable fines on the other hand represent a real risk of a loss and 
therefore appear to be a powerful tool for regulators. Against this, criminal sanctions 
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appear powerless to curb insider trading as evidenced by the increased informed trading. 
This also matches with the anecdotal evidence from those countries with criminal 
sanctions. Only the US and Australia appear to have had a significant number of 
criminal prosecutions, while most of the other countries who have criminally prosecuted 
have done so on only one or two occasions. In addition the Netherlands appears to have 
completely removed criminal sanctions after an earlier attempt to completely 
criminalise insider trading failed to secure prosecutions due to the burden of proof. In 
many cases the lack of a ‘smoking gun’, a direct connection between the information 
obtained and the trading, makes a criminal prosecution impossible to secure. Therefore, 
while being a significantly stronger sanction in that you are depriving an individual of 
their liberty, along with non-judicial punishments such as restrictions on board 
memberships etc, it is not seen as a credible threat. Even longer criminal sanctions are 
not able to correct this view held by insiders.  
The results for the enforcement measures are, in contrast to those for the scope 
and sanction variables, largely as predicted based on prior evidence. Enforced, a dummy 
measuring if a country has previously prosecuted an insider, as shown in Table 4 
indicates that prior enforcement does affect the prevalence of insiders.  As argued by 
Bhattachayra and Daouk (2002), prior enforcement is required to convince the market 
that the laws are more than ornamental. A prior attempt to enforce the laws proves that 
the country possesses the political will to enforce insider trading. More recently 
Bhattachayra and Daouk (2007) have even shown that not enforcing insider trading 
laws results in worse outcomes than not introducing laws at all. While enforcement 
appears to be important, criminal enforcement like criminal sanctions is not. The 
coefficient is positive but insignificant indicating that not even a successful prosecution 
can convince insiders of the validity of criminal sanctions. Again this is likely a result 
of the difficulty in prosecution such that even a proven ability to prosecute an insider is 
not enough to convince insiders that it is a practical sanction.  
Public exhibits similar characteristics to Enforced. This is a measure based on 
LLSV(2003) that indicates the strength of the public enforcer based on their 
independence, focus and investigative abilities. In this case we observe that countries 
with stronger regulators observe a decrease in the prevalence of informed trading. By 
contrast, Private enforcement is not even uniformly in the correct direction. This 
finding regarding the respective merits of private and public enforcement supports that 
of Beny (2005) who also showed that public enforcement is important in the context of 
insider trading. The reason argued in that and other papers is that insider trading is 
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realistically too complicated and costly for small investors to be able to enforce. Even 
the difficulties in establishing that insider trading has actually occurred are likely 
outside the ability of small investors to establish. For this reason, in the US most private 
prosecutions have been largely restricted to piggy-backing on public prosecutions by the 
SEC (Bainbridge, 2000). The experience of New Zealand with regards to a private only 
enforcement regime certainly supports the ineffective nature of this type of system for 
controlling insider trading. It is therefore of little surprise that private enforcement does 
virtually nothing to reduce the incidence of insider trading.  
 
3.3 Impact on Spreads.  
When we examine the impact on the trading costs we find similar results, 
although the results are stronger for several of the variables. We observe a significant 
reduction in the percentage spread when we look at the impact of both stronger laws, IT 
Law, and the breadth of the laws, Scope. These are interesting findings and appear to 
indicate that the markets reaction to insider trading laws maybe stronger than the 
reaction of insiders. The results for both suggest that there is evidence of investor 
confidence being improved by stronger insider trading laws. When we look at the 
realised spreads and the decomposed proportion of information asymmetry in the total 
spread we observe that while stronger and broader insider trading laws have a negative 
impact on the information asymmetry component of the spreads, that this is 
insignificant. The fact that the perceived level of information asymmetry does not 
appear to have decreased enough to account for the total reduction in total spreads 
would suggest that legal regimes that are stronger and broader also have lower liquidity 
components. Ausbel (1990) amongst others argues that when insider trading is prevalent 
it causes insiders to lose confidence in the market and as a result to reduce their 
participation in the market, reducing liquidity and arguable increasing spreads as a 
result. Our finding in relation to the percentage spreads suggests that laws can convince 
not only liquidity providers to reduce the risk component associated with informed 
trading, but also encourages market confidence. 
When we examine the sanction variables the results are similar to that for the 
prevalence of insiders. Sanctions is negative and significant which is driven by financial 
damages. We find that variable damages are most effective, while disgorgement is in 
the right direction and fixed fines cause no reduction in the spreads. Unlike the level of 
informed trading however, the total spreads appear to be reduced significantly by both 
larger fixed and variable fines. As noted above, fixed fines offer little disincentive 
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unless set so high that insiders are unable to trade sufficiently to cover any fine if they 
are caught. Whereas insiders did not see the level of fixed fines available as a threat to 
their profitability, it appears the markets hold a differing view. This is not however 
supported when we examine the information asymmetry component measures. Neither 
show the level of the fixed fine has a significant impact in reducing the information 
asymmetry costs associated with insider trading. However, it maybe that larger fixed 
fines do inspire confidence in market participants.  
The spread results do show however that again criminal is completely 
unimportant in controlling insiders. While the variable Criminal is negative, it is 
insignificant, as it is also for realised spreads. Longer potential jail sentences also do 
little to make criminal sanctions a more effective deterrent as indicated by the positive 
coefficients, not only for total spreads but also for the information asymmetry 
components. Criminal enforcement again also fails to make criminal sanctions an 
effective deterrent although it is in the right direction. The results are even worse for the 
proportion of the spread made up of information asymmetry which has positive 
coefficients for both Criminal and Criminal Enforcement. Again, as per the impact on 
informed trading, we see that criminal sanctions are ineffective in controlling insiders. 
Even longer sentences and actual enforcement cannot convince either the market or 
insiders that criminal sanctions are an effective deterrent. Financial damages on the 
other hand do appear to be a compelling deterrent to insiders, especially for variable 
damages which result in insiders definitely facing financial losses when caught and 
convicted.  
Enforcement is also important from the markets perspective which confirms 
previous findings by Bhattacharya and Daouk and also the PIN results. Interestingly, 
though the information asymmetry component measures both are negative but 
insignificantly so. This suggests that as per the general strength and scope of the laws 
that enforcement may improve confidence in the market. Although all three measures 
do agree that enforcement is most effective when done via a public watchdog as 
opposed to private enforcement. In fact only realised spreads have a negative coefficient 
for Private while the other two have positive values.  
Overall the results for both the probability of informed trading as well as the 
spread measures are broadly consistent. It is financial damages and enforcement that are 
most effective in controlling the prevalence and harm from insiders. In particular, the 
more heavily that insiders are likely to be fined, and situations that assure the market 
that insiders will face a financial penalty greater than their profits, result in the greatest 
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reductions, while public watchdogs appear to act as a suitable deterrent to insiders. Of 
interest though is the fact that  certain factors appear to result in a positive effect on the 
market in excess of the impact on either insiders trading or the information asymmetry 
costs they cause. Stronger overall laws, broader laws (despite difficulties in prosecution) 
and past enforcement appear to increase market confidence and as a result have a 
greater impact on overall spreads than they do on the part of the spreads most affected 
by insiders.  
 
4 Conclusion  
 
Despite the vast majority of countries regulating insider trading, little research 
has been done on the specific elements required to create an insider trading regime that 
effectively reduces the level of insider trading and information asymmetry. The lack of 
research comes however in spite of findings both with regards to insider trading and 
financial market development generally that the nature and quality of the institutional 
settings within which markets operate has a significant impact on the market. This study 
sought to provide answers to two questions, what are the specific elements of insider 
trading regulations which reduce informational trading and what impact do those 
elements have on trading costs.  
We firstly examined the impact of specific regulatory features on the probability 
of informed trading for a sample of companies from 18 countries and related those to a 
number of variables measuring the scope of the laws, sanctions the laws could impose 
including the maximum level of the sanctions and the enforcement strength within the 
country. After controlling for other factors that could impact on informational trading, 
we found that reduced insider trading is predominantly driven by financial damanges 
and public enforcement. Given the frequency with which criminal sanctions are made 
available within the law, the find that criminal sanctions offered little disincentive to 
insiders irrespective of length of sanctions or if they have been implemented is 
concerning.  
When we examine the second question, the impact of regulations on the trading 
costs, we find very similar results with a couple of notable exceptions. The results for 
the information asymmetry component of the spreads is broadly consistent with the PIN 
results. What is different is that enforcement, the overall strength of the laws and the 
breadth of the laws in terms of what was considered insider trading all had a greater 
impact on total spreads than on the informational component, suggesting some aspects 
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of insider trading laws can be important in inspiring greater market confidence in the 
market.  
We have shown that there are some aspects of insider trading regulations that 
countries should seek to implement. In particular, we find that the criminal sanctions 
and weak financial damages of the Germanic civil law countries in the sample would 
appear to be less than ideal. As such we have provided some first evidence that may be 
useful to policy makers to help in determining what should and should not be included 
in an insider trading regime. This is however only first evidence and as such more work 
needs to be done, particularly in refining the variables to allow more firm conclusions to 
be drawn.  
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Table 1: Summary of Insider Trading Law Variables by Country 
 
Country IT Law Scope Tippee Tipping Sanction Criminal  Damages Disgorge 
Fixed 
(US$) Variable 
Criminal 
Max Enforced 
Criminal 
Enforced Private  Public 
Common Law Countries 
AUSTRALIA 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 148633 0 5 1 1 5 0,88 
CANADA 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 825491 0 5 1 1 5,5 0,81 
HONG KONG 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 3 10 1 0 0 0,75 
INDIA 3 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 5668954 3 0 1 0 0 0,69 
MALAYSIA 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 2,5 0,69 
NEW ZEALAND 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0 5,5 0,63 
SINGAPORE 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 150331 0 7 1 0 4,5 0,75 
SOUTH AFRICA 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 315333 3 10 0 0 2 0,38 
UNITED KINGDOM 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 Unltd. 7 1 1 0 0,63 
UNITED STATES 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1000000 3 10 1 1 5 1 
Common Law Averages 3,4 1,9 0,9 1 1,5 0,9 0,6 0,6 810874 1,67 6,4 0,7 0,4 3 0,721 
                
French Civil Law Countries 
BELGIUM 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 42223 3 1 1 0 0 0,13 
FRANCE 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 8444520 10 2 1 0 0 0,94 
GREECE 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 1 8444520 5 0 1 0 0 0,38 
NETHERLANDS 3 2 1 1 1 0 1 0 760007 0 0 1 0 0 0,5 
French Civil Law Averages 3,5 2 1 1 1,5 0,5 1 0,5 4422817 4,5 0,75 1 0 0 0,4875 
                
German Civil Law Countries 
AUSTRIA 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 912008 0 3 0 0 0 0,13 
GERMANY 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 5 1 1 0 0,25 
JAPAN 2 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 27239 0 3 1 1 0 0 
TAIWAN 3 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 93229 0 7 1 1 3 0,38 
German Civil Law Averages 2,75 1,75 1 0,75 1 1 0 0,25 258119 0 4,5 0,75 0,75 0,75 0,19 
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Note: IT Law is the sum of Scope and Sanction. Scope is a created by adding Tipping and Tippee. Tipping is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an insider is prohibited from passing on confidential information and 0 
otherwise. Tippee is a dummy variable that equals 1 if an outsider given confidential information by an insider is prohibited from trading and 0 otherwise. Sanction is created by adding Damages and Criminal. 
Damages is a dummy that equals 1 if potential financial penalties are greater than the gain or loss avoided and 0 otherwise. Criminal is a dummy that equals 1 if criminal sanctions are available and 0 otherwise. 
Disgorge is a dummy that equals 1 if financial penalties automatically cover the level of gain made or loss avoided. Fixed is the maximum fixed level fine available converted into US$. Variable is the maximum 
variable level fine available as a multiple of the gain made or loss avoided. Criminal Max is the maximum numbers of years an insider can be jailed for. Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if insider trading 
had been prosecuted before 1998 and 0 otherwise. Criminal Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if criminal sanctions have been successfully applied in an insider trading case. Private is the product of the right 
of private enforcement, a dummy that equals 1 where private prosecutions are allowed and 0 otherwise, and the law and order rating collected from International Country Risk Guide. Public is the mean of the 
supervisor attributes and investigative powers from La Porta et al. (2003).  
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Table 2: Cross-Sectional Averages by Country of Origin 
 
Country Market System Trades 
Mkt Cap 
(local) 
Mkt Cap 
(US$) 
Average 
Spread 
Average 
Price %Spread 
Effective 
Spread 
Average 
Volume 
AUSTRALIA Limit Order Book 34999 1010,86 751,24 0,0042 3,25 0,91 1,81 1907245 
AUSTRIA Limit Order Book 16426 1360,00 1148,45 0,3434 59,54 0,67 0,79 65867 
BELGIUM 
Affirmative 
Dealers 18681 3571,13 3015,65 0,2253 37,96 0,86 1,04 20627 
CANADA Limit Order Book 46276 1897,38 1566,27 0,0569 14,83 1,58 1,70 223314 
FRANCE 
Affirmative 
Dealers 124922 5980,30 5050,08 0,2564 43,56 0,79 0,90 962935 
GERMANY 
Affirmative 
Dealers 66389 4289,90 3622,61 0,0757 21,37 1,00 1,20 263100 
GREECE Limit Order Book 21597 251,36 212,26 0,0235 3,19 1,00 2,29 49165 
HONG KONG Limit Order Book 23366 7546,09 970,27 0,0271 4,28 1,49 1,46 12542806 
INDIA Limit Order Book 64026 31715,23 719,17 1,4491 305,60 0,54 0,62 48364 
JAPAN Limit Order Book 30282 182547,50 1657,45 36,1897 9352,50 0,41 0,42 567101 
MALAYSIA Limit Order Book 10855 969,06 256,71 0,0172 2,08 1,01 1,02 517670 
NETHERLANDS 
Affirmative 
Dealers 89655 1964,35 1658,80 0,0612 17,14 0,64 0,80 777253 
NEW ZEALAND Limit Order Book 5469 3173,32 2168,60 0,0316 4,50 0,92 1,00 232646 
SINGAPORE Limit Order Book 9399 408,73 245,78 0,0139 1,86 1,97 1,69 863202 
SOUTH AFRICA Limit Order Book 17995 7869,53 1240,76 14,3077 2675,52 1,47 1,55 371387 
TAIWAN Limit Order Book 30871 9296,78 288,91 0,0940 20,31 0,64 0,69 2504 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
Affirmative 
Dealers 147051 3527,84 6483,67 2,8599 529,90 0,18 0,49 539113 
UNITED STATES 
Affirmative 
Dealers 321896 7260,75 7260,75 0,0443 35,06 0,16 0,12 1036896 
Note: Mkt Cap (Local) is the average of the market capitalisation averaged over the sample period for all sample companies in that country. 
Mkt Cap ($US) is the market capitalisation averaged over the sample period adjusted daily for the US$ exchange rate averaged for all sample 
companies in that country. Spread is measured as the ask price minus the bid price averaged over the sample period and then over all sample 
companies in that country. Average Price is the cross-sectional average price at which trades occurred averaged over all sample companies 
in that country. % Spread is measured as the cross-sectional average of the (ask price – bid price)/((ask + bid)/2) then averaged over all 
sample companies in that country. Effective Spread is measured as the cross-sectional average of itititit midmidpx /)(**200 −  then 
averaged over all sample companies in that country where midit is the midpoint and xit is the trade direction. Average Volume is the average 
of the number of shares traded per trade for each company, aggregated into a country level average.  
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Table 3: Insider Trading Law Variable Correlation Coefficients 
 
  Fixed (US$) Variable Criminal Max Private  Public 
Fixed (US$) 1     
Variable 0.5363 1    
Criminal Max -0.4757 -0.0968 1   
Private  -0.3358 -0.3291 0.2991 1  
Public 0.1977 0.2857 0.3024 0.5298 1 
 
Note: Fixed is the maximum fixed level fine available converted into US$. Variable is the maximum variable level fine 
available as a multiple of the gain made or loss avoided. Criminal Max is the maximum numbers of years an insider can be 
jailed for. Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if insider trading had been prosecuted before 1998 and 0 otherwise. 
Private is the product of the right of private enforcement, a dummy that equals 1 where private prosecutions are allowed and 
0 otherwise, and the law and order rating collected from International Country Risk Guide. Public is the mean of the 
supervisor attributes and investigative powers from La Porta et al. (2003).  
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Table 4: PIN Model Regression Results  
 
Intercept 0,2975  0,2665  0,2441  0,2627  0,2834  0,2816  0,3208 
  0,0563  0,0543  0,1796  0,0538  0,0539  0,0712  0,0518 
Corrupt -0,0540  -0,0577  -0,0385  -0,0388  -0,0388  -0,0303  0,0394 
  0,0398  0,0361  0,0527  0,0379  0,0379  0,0407  0,0364 
Gov Effect -0,0046  -0,0525  -0,0450  -0,0101  -0,0101  -0,0444  -0,0034 
  0,0522  0,0585  0,0599  0,0735  0,0735  0,0601  0,0467 
Pol Stab 0,1715  0,1945  0,0682  0,1188  0,1188  0,0977  0,0316 
  0,0564  0,0529  0,1348  0,0798  0,0798  0,0899  0,0941 
Voice -0,0422  -0,0408  -0,0392  -0,0387  -0,0387  -0,0369  -0,0300 
  0,0216  0,0196  0,0211  0,0195  0,0195  0,0221  0,0204 
Anti-Self 
Dealing -0,0075  -0,0322  -0,0070  -0,0248  -0,0248  -0,0026  -0,0125 
  0,0617  0,0608  0,0600  0,0621  0,0621  0,0617  0,0561 
French 0,0696  0,0585  0,0596  0,0574  0,0574  0,0634  0,0475 
  0,0361  0,0334  0,0364  0,0330  0,0330  0,0353  0,0345 
German 0,0144  -0,0192  0,0034  -0,0110  -0,0110  0,0032  0,0110 
  0,0357  0,0382  0,0361  0,0392  0,0392  0,0359  0,0319 
Trades/Day -0,0001  -0,0001  0,0000  -0,0001  -0,0001  -0,0001  0,0000 
  0,0000  0,0000  0,0001  0,0001  0,0001  0,0001  0,0001 
Reg Qual -0,2017  -0,1538  -0,1447  -0,1363  -0,1363  -0,1530  -0,0498 
  0,0557  0,0582  0,0663  0,0588  0,0588  0,0611  0,0997 
               
IT Law   -0,0401           
    0,0242           
Scope     -0,0202         
      0,1196         
Sanction       -0,0207       
        0,0077       
Criminal          0,0407     
          0,0277     
Damages           -0,0388   
            0,0021   
Enforced              -0,0693 
              0,0309 
               
Adjust R2 0,4788   0,6541   0,5015   0,5492   0,5492   0,5022   0,6661 
Note:PIN is measured as εαµ
αµ
2+=PIN .Corrupt measures how prevalent corruption is within the system. Gov Effect 
measures the quality of the public and civil service, the autonomy of civil servants and the quality of policy formation and 
implementation. Pol Stab measures the perceived likelihood of political destabilisation by unconstitutional or violent means. 
Voice measures the ability of citizens to participate in the selection of the government and rights such as free speech. Anti-Self 
Dealing measures the efficacy of private enforcement within a country to stop self dealing by directors. French is a dummy 
that equals 1 for French Civil Law Countries. German is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Germanic Civil Law countries. 
Trades/Day is the country level average of average number of trades per day for the sample countries. Reg Qual measures the 
ability of the country to construct and implement sound laws designed to promote private sector development. IT Law is an 
index created by adding Scope and Sanction. Scope is a sub-index created by adding Tipping and Tippee. Sanction is a sub-
index created by adding Damages and Criminal. Damages is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the potential financial penalties 
may be greater than the trading gain or loss avoided and 0 otherwise. Criminal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if criminal 
sanctions are available and 0 otherwise. Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if insider trading had been prosecuted 
before 1998 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 5: PIN Regression Results for Penalty Variables 
Intercept 0.2852  0.2865  0.2780  0.2475  0.2809  0.2758  0.2682  
  0.1228  0.0929  0.0415  0.0345  0.0592  0.0377  0.0670  
Corrupt -0.0129  -0.0394  -0.0214  -0.0936  -0.0431  -0.0090  -0.0335  
  0.0698  0.0544  0.0405  0.0316  0.0498  0.0320  0.0397  
Gov Effect -0.0932  -0.0439  -0.1438  -0.0010  -0.0365  -0.1155  -0.0478  
  0.1672  0.0620  0.0638  0.0373  0.0660  0.0466  0.0556  
Pol Stab 0.0602  0.0672  -0.0037  0.0312  0.0963  0.0809  0.0865  
  0.1575  0.1337  0.0718  0.0477  0.0757  0.0493  0.0720  
Voice -0.0409  -0.0393  -0.0443  -0.0069  -0.0445  -0.0239  -0.0382  
  0.0361  0.0212  0.0159  0.0165  0.0273  0.0154  0.0206  
Anti-Self Dealing -0.0470  -0.0073  -0.1165  -0.0058  -0.0056  -0.0303  -0.0039  
  0.1570  0.0602  0.0728  0.0363  0.0590  0.0422  0.0614  
French 0.0457  0.0597  -0.0065  0.1011  0.0693  0.0136  0.0640  
  0.0650  0.0360  0.0437  0.0248  0.0408  0.0310  0.0389  
German 0.0046  0.0032  -0.0129  -0.0070  0.0023  -0.0230  0.0085  
  0.0456  0.0362  0.0277  0.0214  0.0352  0.0265  0.0436  
Trades/Day 0.0000  0.0000  -0.0001  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
  0.0001  0.0001  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  0.0000  0.0001  
Reg Qual -0.1390  -0.1447  -0.0756  -0.1630  -0.1565  -0.1497  -0.1491  
  0.0893  0.0654  0.0588  0.0361  0.0616  0.0404  0.0592  
                
D Fixed 0.0125              
  0.0527              
D Variable -0.0134              
  0.0059              
D Disgorgement -0.0044              
  0.0306              
Damages Fixed   -0.0090            
    0.0501            
Damages 
Variable     -0.0083          
      0.0043          
Criminal Max       0.0105        
        0.0036        
Criminal 
Enforced          0.00966      
          0.02886      
Public           
-
0.00836    
            0.00352    
Private             0.00564  
              0.04517  
                              
Adjust R2 0.50793   0.50185   0.71364   0.81461   0.50962   0.76414   0.5002   
Note:PIN is measured as εαµ
αµ
2+=PIN .Corrupt measures how prevalent corruption is within the system. Gov Effect measures 
the quality of the public and civil service, the autonomy of civil servants and the quality of policy formation and implementation. Pol 
Stab measures the perceived likelihood of political destabilisation by unconstitutional or violent means. Voice measures the ability of 
citizens to participate in the selection of the government and rights such as free speech. Anti-Self Dealing measures the efficacy of 
private enforcement within a country to stop self dealing by directors. French is a dummy that equals 1 for French Civil Law 
Countries. German is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Germanic Civil Law countries. Trades/Day is the country level average of 
average number of trades per day for the sample countries. Reg Qual measures the ability of the country to construct and implement 
sound laws designed to promote private sector development Disgorge is a dummy variable that equals 1 if financial penalties 
automatically cover the level of gain made or loss avoided. Fixed is the maximum fixed level fine available converted into US$. 
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Variable is the maximum variable level fine available as a multiple of the gain made or loss avoided. Criminal Max is the maximum 
numbers of years an insider can be jailed for. Criminal Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if criminal sanctions have been 
successfully applied in an insider trading case. Private is the product of the right of private enforcement, a dummy that equals 1 
where private prosecutions are allowed and 0 otherwise, and the law and order rating collected from International Country Risk 
Guide. Public is the mean of the supervisor attributes and investigative powers from La Porta et al. (2003).  
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Table 6: Percentage Spread Regression Results  
Intercept 1.4945 0.2909 0.9197 1.7792 0.8938 1.4729 1.4574
0.7236 0.6877 0.6548 0.6675 0.7339 0.7700 0.8211
Corrupt -0.0185 -0.5109 -0.4350 -0.9566 -0.9566 -0.0085 -0.0352
0.5119 0.4172 0.4651 0.7086 0.7086 0.5487 0.5606
Gov Effect -0.4887 -1.1299 -0.1342 -0.5532 -0.5532 -0.3361 -0.4764
0.6710 0.7649 0.5787 0.6011 0.6011 0.8431 0.7223
Pol Stab -0.4994 -0.2533 -0.8111 -1.0522 -1.0522 -0.4970 -0.5114
0.7251 0.5997 0.6169 0.7225 0.7225 0.7690 0.7794
Voice -0.4365 -0.4973 -0.6028 -0.4107 -0.4107 -0.4008 -0.4253
0.2773 0.2057 0.2419 0.2484 0.2484 0.3125 0.3077
Anti-Self Dealing -0.7538 -1.4042 -1.4442 1.3228 1.3228 -0.4649 -0.7430
0.7937 0.6306 0.7299 1.3921 1.3921 1.2009 0.8513
French 0.3444 0.5336 0.6290 0.5871 0.5871 0.2460 0.3522
0.4639 0.3489 0.4056 0.6787 0.6787 0.5719 0.4987
German 0.5515 1.1229 0.6901 0.7702 0.7702 0.4714 0.5504
0.4598 0.3967 0.3857 0.8661 0.8661 0.5424 0.4910
Trades/Day -0.0014 -0.0013 -0.0017 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0014
0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0007
Reg Qual -0.3877 -0.7958 -0.3898 -0.8456 -0.8456 -0.5130 -0.3830
0.7170 0.5489 0.5931 0.9575 0.9575 0.8462 0.7663
IT Law -0.6813
0.2455
Scope -0.7809
0.3606
Sanction -0.9854
0.5106
Criminal -0.0759
0.2251
Damages -0.8854
0.4511
Enforced -0.0412
0.0131
Adjust R 2 0.2418 0.3723 0.3637 0.5537 0.1363 0.6963 0.6180  
Note: Percentage Spread is measured as the absolute spread divided by the midpoint of quotes. Corrupt measures how 
prevalent corruption is within the system. Gov Effect measures the quality of the public and civil service, the autonomy of civil 
servants and the quality of policy formation and implementation. Pol Stab measures the perceived likelihood of political 
destabilisation by unconstitutional or violent means. Voice measures the ability of citizens to participate in the selection of the 
government and rights such as free speech. Anti-Self Dealing measures the efficacy of private enforcement within a country to 
stop self dealing by directors. French is a dummy that equals 1 for French Civil Law Countries. German is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 for Germanic Civil Law countries. Trades/Day is the country level average of average number of trades per day 
for the sample countries. Reg Qual measures the ability of the country to construct and implement sound laws designed to 
promote private sector development. IT Law is an index created by adding Scope and Sanction. Scope is a sub-index created by 
adding Tipping and Tippee. Sanction is a sub-index created by adding Damages and Criminal. Damages is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if the potential financial penalties may be greater than the trading gain or loss avoided and 0 otherwise. Criminal 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 if criminal sanctions are available and 0 otherwise. Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if insider trading had been prosecuted before 1998 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 7: Percentage Spread Regression Results for Legal Penalty Variables 
Intercept 1.4512 2.2693 1.5562 1.8740 1.6963 1.5129 1.4668
0.9334 0.8669 0.7498 0.7793 0.7355 0.7573 0.7609
Corrupt -0.1781 -0.3995 -0.0763 -0.0825 -0.2848 -0.1541 -0.1981
0.8744 0.5487 0.5425 0.5038 0.5580 0.5867 0.6382
Gov Effect -0.2238 -0.0043 -0.4060 -0.4538 -0.4702 -0.2866 -0.2104
1.1021 0.7171 0.6999 0.6571 0.6612 0.7876 0.8838
Pol Stab -0.0499 -0.7848 -0.2061 -0.3766 -0.2832 -0.5181 -0.5201
2.5402 0.7092 0.8459 0.7173 0.7403 0.7589 0.7617
Voice -0.5173 -0.5219 -0.3531 -0.4608 -0.5794 -0.4376 -0.4981
0.7838 0.2671 0.3071 0.2721 0.3018 0.2899 0.3141
Anti-Self Dealing -0.4920 -0.9608 -0.5170 -1.4469 -0.7343 -0.3956 -0.6373
1.5438 0.7591 0.8781 0.9782 0.7822 1.0448 0.8622
French 0.3437 0.4555 0.3486 0.5418 0.3629 0.2453 0.1279
0.8409 0.4424 0.4777 0.4844 0.4573 0.5159 0.6401
German 0.5893 0.7186 0.6314 0.9295 0.4283 0.5535 0.4223
0.8401 0.4471 0.4857 0.5546 0.4663 0.4807 0.5425
Trades/Day -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0012 -0.0014 -0.0012 -0.0013 -0.0014
0.0025 0.0006 0.0007 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006 0.0006
Reg Qual -0.5742 -0.3718 -0.2492 -0.2975 -0.0140 -0.3983 -0.4117
1.0728 0.6734 0.7618 0.7057 0.7930 0.7499 0.7535
D Fixed 0.1493
0.9710
D Variable -0.0283
0.0107
D Disgorgement -0.2307
0.9384
Damages Fixed -0.0040
0.0021
Damages Variable -0.0330
0.0145
Criminal Max 0.0403
0.0346
Criminal Enforced -0.29444
0.264135
Public -0.32218
0.157094
Private 0.037869
0.072759
Adjust R 2 0.553738 0.507766 0.408106 0.465666 0.458227 0.389812 0.385823
 
Note: Percentage Spread is measured as the absolute spread divided by the midpoint of quotes. Corrupt measures how prevalent 
corruption is within the system. Gov Effect measures the quality of the public and civil service, the autonomy of civil servants and the 
quality of policy formation and implementation. Pol Stab measures the perceived likelihood of political destabilisation by 
unconstitutional or violent means. Voice measures the ability of citizens to participate in the selection of the government and rights 
such as free speech. Anti-Self Dealing measures the efficacy of private enforcement within a country to stop self dealing by directors. 
French is a dummy that equals 1 for French Civil Law Countries. German is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Germanic Civil Law 
countries. Trades/Day is the country level average of average number of trades per day for the sample countries. Reg Qual measures 
the ability of the country to construct and implement sound laws designed to promote private sector development Disgorge is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if financial penalties automatically cover the level of gain made or loss avoided. Fixed is the maximum 
fixed level fine available converted into US$. Variable is the maximum variable level fine available as a multiple of the gain made or 
loss avoided. Criminal Max is the maximum numbers of years an insider can be jailed for. Criminal Enforced is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 if criminal sanctions have been successfully applied in an insider trading case. Private is the product of the right of 
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private enforcement, a dummy that equals 1 where private prosecutions are allowed and 0 otherwise, and the law and order rating 
collected from International Country Risk Guide. Public is the mean of the supervisor attributes and investigative powers from La 
Porta et al. (2003).  
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Table 8: Information Asymmetry Component Regression Results 
Proportion of Information Asymmetry Realised Spreads
Intercept 0.7575 0.7392 0.8029 0.7248 2.4011 2.5923 2.2349 2.5786
0.1491 0.2051 0.1803 0.1660 0.7561 1.0351 0.9220 0.8387
Corrupt -0.0813 -0.0738 -0.1101 -0.0774 -0.0320 -0.1102 -0.0736 -0.0530
0.1055 0.1244 0.1244 0.1104 0.5348 0.6279 0.6365 0.5580
Gov Effect 0.0699 0.0452 0.1133 0.0097 -1.9833 -1.7261 -2.1424 -1.6562
0.1383 0.2281 0.1685 0.1788 0.7011 1.1512 0.8618 0.9036
Pol Stab 0.2810 0.2925 0.2568 0.3053 1.8436 1.7240 1.9324 1.7118
0.1494 0.1789 0.1640 0.1618 0.7577 0.9026 0.8388 0.8176
Voice 0.1542 0.1533 0.1599 0.1557 -0.0302 -0.0206 -0.0509 -0.0381
0.0572 0.0614 0.0610 0.0598 0.2898 0.3096 0.3121 0.3020
Anti-Self Dealing -0.2620 -0.2719 -0.2636 -0.3038 -0.9730 -0.8697 -0.9674 -0.7461
0.1636 0.1881 0.1718 0.1859 0.8293 0.9492 0.8785 0.9393
French 0.2225 0.2254 0.2224 0.2342 0.3246 0.2945 0.3249 0.2613
0.0956 0.1041 0.1004 0.1020 0.4847 0.5251 0.5133 0.5151
German 0.1402 0.1489 0.1401 0.1756 0.6186 0.5279 0.6189 0.4264
0.0948 0.1183 0.0995 0.1168 0.4804 0.5971 0.5088 0.5901
Trades/Day 0.0000 -0.0399 -0.0186 -0.0275 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0007 -0.0007
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Reg Qual -0.3225 -0.3163 -0.2952 -0.2720 0.5600 0.4951 0.4602 0.2854
0.1478 0.1637 0.1641 0.1779 0.7491 0.8262 0.8395 0.8991
IT Law -0.0104 -0.1082
0.0732 0.3695
Scope -0.0457 -0.1673
0.0899 0.4599
Sanction -0.0227 -0.2296
0.0274 0.1079
Adjust R 2 0.4306 0.4650 0.4826 0.4874 0.4314 0.4709 0.4744 0.4919
 Prop is measured as θ/( θ + φ) averaged over the sample companies for each country. Realised Spreads is the country average of the realised 
spreads calculated as )2/)/(())(2/)(( ,,,,,, tititttitititi bappbapRS +−−+−= +τ . Corrupt measures how prevalent corruption is 
within the system. Gov Effect measures the quality of the public and civil service, the autonomy of civil servants and the quality of policy 
formation and implementation. Pol Stab measures the perceived likelihood of political destabilisation by unconstitutional or violent means. 
Voice measures the ability of citizens to participate in the selection of the government and rights such as free speech. Anti-Self Dealing 
measures the efficacy of private enforcement within a country to stop self dealing by directors. French is a dummy that equals 1 for French 
Civil Law Countries. German is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Germanic Civil Law countries. Trades/Day is the country level average of 
average number of trades per day for the sample countries. Reg Qual measures the ability of the country to construct and implement sound laws 
designed to promote private sector development. IT Law is an index created by adding Scope and Sanction. Scope is a sub-index created by 
adding Tipping and Tippee. Sanction is a sub-index created by adding Damages and Criminal. .Sanction is a sub-index created by adding 
Damages and Criminal.
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Table 9: Information Asymmetry Component Regression Results for Legal Penalty Variables 
Proportion of Informaion Asymmetry Realised Spreads
Intercept 0.76708 0.7855 0.4556 0.7877 0.6951 2.3490 2.4757 1.3190 3.0408 2.4670
0.15674 0.1703 0.2462 0.2038 0.1169 0.7919 0.8716 1.4959 0.9628 0.8175
Corrupt -0.0774 -0.0994 -0.1167 -0.0668 0.0342 -0.0530 -0.0801 -0.1403 -0.2750 -0.1540
0.11044 0.11897 0.1248 0.1280 0.0926 0.5580 0.6089 0.7582 0.6046 0.6472
Gov Effect 0.00968 0.06523 -0.0385 0.0518 -0.1167 -1.6562 -1.9957 -2.3599 -2.3667 -1.7861
0.17884 0.14631 0.2089 0.1659 0.1286 0.9036 0.7488 1.2694 0.7840 0.8988
Pol Stab 0.30527 0.28708 0.2986 0.2696 0.3783 1.7118 1.8597 1.9004 1.6022 1.7408
0.16183 0.15832 0.1496 0.1663 0.1207 0.8176 0.8103 0.9091 0.7856 0.8440
Voice 0.1557 0.16458 0.2283 0.1505 0.1795 -0.0381 -0.0027 -0.2205 -0.1098 -0.0569
0.05978 0.06491 0.0681 0.0629 0.0449 0.3020 0.3322 0.4140 0.2972 0.3141
Anti-Self Dealing -0.3038 -0.2437 -0.1377 -0.2705 -0.0378 -0.7461 -0.9243 -0.5520 -1.1518 -1.2899
0.18592 0.17777 0.2345 0.1778 0.1714 0.9393 0.9098 1.4244 0.8401 1.1982
French 0.23417 0.21574 0.2600 0.2262 0.0406 0.2613 0.3065 0.4615 0.4037 0.5168
0.10196 0.10209 0.1090 0.1030 0.1019 0.5151 0.5225 0.6624 0.4867 0.7127
German 0.17555 0.14831 0.1295 0.1463 0.1017 0.4264 0.6403 0.5743 0.7479 0.6593
0.11679 0.10176 0.0911 0.1041 0.0742 0.5901 0.5208 0.5534 0.4921 0.5188
Trades/Day -0.0275 -0.0554 -0.0296 -0.0298 -0.2338 -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0004
0.00013 0.00014 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0007 0.0008 0.0006 0.0009
Reg Qual -0.272 -0.316 -0.1485 -0.3236 -0.4380 0.2854 0.5773 1.1645 0.5367 0.6821
0.17795 0.15664 0.1635 0.1574 0.1219 0.8991 0.8017 0.9935 0.7437 0.8525
Criminal 0.0423 -0.0489
0.0740 0.3738
Damages -0.01837 -0.2296
0.0043 0.1184
D Fixed 0.1335 0.4836
0.1107 0.6723
D Variable -0.1009 -0.3689
0.0425 0.1501
D Disgorgement -0.0763 -0.2520
0.0509 0.1309
Damages Fixed -0.0154 -0.0003
0.0653 0.0003
Damages Variable -0.0237 -0.0251
0.0092 0.0116
Adjust R 2 0.48741 0.47733 0.5866 0.4678 0.7238 0.4919 0.4683 0.5074 0.5386 0.4757  
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Note: Prop is measured as θ/( θ + φ) averaged over the sample companies for each country. Realised Spreads is the country average of the realised spreads calculated as 
)2/)/(())(2/)(( ,,,,,, tititttitititi bappbapRS +−−+−= +τ . Corrupt measures how prevalent corruption is within the system. Gov Effect measures the quality of the public and civil 
service, the autonomy of civil servants and the quality of policy formation and implementation. Pol Stab measures the perceived likelihood of political destabilisation by unconstitutional or 
violent means. Voice measures the ability of citizens to participate in the selection of the government and rights such as free speech. Anti-Self Dealing measures the efficacy of private 
enforcement within a country to stop self dealing by directors. French is a dummy that equals 1 for French Civil Law Countries. German is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Germanic Civil 
Law countries. Trades/Day is the country level average of average number of trades per day for the sample countries. Reg Qual measures the ability of the country to construct and implement 
sound laws designed to promote private sector development Damages is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the potential financial penalties may be greater than the trading gain or loss avoided and 
0 otherwise. Criminal is a dummy variable that equals 1 if criminal sanctions are available and 0 otherwise.  Disgorge is a dummy variable that equals 1 if financial penalties automatically cover 
the level of gain made or loss avoided. Fixed is the maximum fixed level fine available converted into US$. Variable is the maximum variable level fine available as a multiple of the gain made 
or loss avoided. Criminal Max is the maximum numbers of years an insider can be jailed for. Criminal Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if criminal sanctions have been successfully 
applied in an insider trading case. Private is the product of the right of private enforcement, a dummy that equals 1 where private prosecutions are allowed and 0 otherwise, and the law and order 
rating collected from International Country Risk Guide. Public is the mean of the supervisor attributes and investigative powers from La Porta et al. (2003).  
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Table 10: Information Asymmetry Component Regression Results for Enforcement Variables 
Proportion of Information Asymmetry Realised Spread
Intercept 0.7355 0.7597 0.7705 0.8088 0.7568 2.7390 2.4013 2.3030 2.9202 2.4025
0.1676 0.1538 0.1617 0.1868 0.1598 0.7716 0.8084 0.8100 0.8943 0.8102
Corrupt -0.0714 -0.0295 -0.0586 -0.0948 -0.0766 -0.1839 -0.0272 -0.2024 -0.1680 -0.0407
0.1145 0.1304 0.1271 0.1139 0.1340 0.5269 0.6851 0.6369 0.5456 0.6796
Gov Effect 0.0626 0.0082 0.0491 0.0904 0.0626 -1.8713 -1.9889 -1.8268 -1.7759 -1.9698
0.1475 0.1663 0.1567 0.1508 0.1856 0.6788 0.8737 0.7847 0.7220 0.9411
Pol Stab 0.2739 0.3085 0.2752 0.2902 0.2805 1.9524 1.8461 1.8872 1.9360 1.8446
0.1591 0.1588 0.1590 0.1580 0.1599 0.7325 0.8344 0.7963 0.7564 0.8111
Voice 0.1609 0.1706 0.1392 0.1516 0.1526 -0.1319 -0.0287 -0.0829 -0.0570 -0.0273
0.0628 0.0632 0.0727 0.0602 0.0660 0.2891 0.3319 0.3643 0.2884 0.3345
Anti-Self 
Dealing -0.2556 -0.2751 -0.2629 -0.2907 -0.2590 -1.0717 -0.9742 -0.9665 -1.2632 -0.9787
0.1738 0.1697 0.1732 0.1810 0.1810 0.8001 0.8917 0.8675 0.8664 0.9181
French -0.2271 0.1948 0.2034 0.2497 0.2169 -0.2539 0.3220 0.4685 0.5993 0.3351
0.1018 0.1058 0.1135 0.1139 0.1344 0.4686 0.5562 0.5684 0.5455 0.6816
German -0.1395 0.1544 0.1495 0.1808 0.1368 -0.6290 0.6200 0.5482 1.0291 0.6249
0.1002 0.0997 0.1034 0.1280 0.1139 0.4614 0.5240 0.5180 0.6128 0.5777
Trades/Day 0.0000 -0.0266 -0.0184 -0.0599 -0.0389 0.0009 -0.0006 -0.0008 -0.0009 -0.0006
0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0006 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007 0.0007
Reg Qual -0.3253 -0.3617 -0.3240 -0.3258 -0.3219 0.6029 0.5564 0.5714 0.5268 0.5588
0.1565 0.1618 0.1565 0.1553 0.1582 0.7202 0.8501 0.7838 0.7436 0.8023
Enforced -0.0244 -0.3747
0.0163 0.2896
Criminal 
Max 0.0074 0.0007
0.0102 0.0536
Criminal 
Enforced 0.0266 -0.2005
0.0715 0.3582
Public -0.0603 -0.6094
0.0220 0.1572
Private 0.0010 -0.0018
0.0153 0.0775
Adjust R 2 0.4748 0.5006 0.4739 0.4823 0.4638 0.5678 0.4645 0.4874 0.5391 0.4645  
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Note: Prop is measured as θ/( θ + φ) averaged over the sample companies for each country. Realised Spreads is the country average of the realised spreads 
calculated as )2/)/(())(2/)(( ,,,,,, tititttitititi bappbapRS +−−+−= +τ . Corrupt measures how prevalent corruption is within the system. Gov 
Effect measures the quality of the public and civil service, the autonomy of civil servants and the quality of policy formation and implementation. Pol Stab 
measures the perceived likelihood of political destabilisation by unconstitutional or violent means. Voice measures the ability of citizens to participate in the 
selection of the government and rights such as free speech. Anti-Self Dealing measures the efficacy of private enforcement within a country to stop self 
dealing by directors. French is a dummy that equals 1 for French Civil Law Countries. German is a dummy variable that equals 1 for Germanic Civil Law 
countries. Trades/Day is the country level average of average number of trades per day for the sample countries. Reg Qual measures the ability of the 
country to construct and implement sound laws designed to promote private sector development. Criminal Max is the maximum numbers of years an insider 
can be jailed for. Enforced is a dummy variable that equals 1 if insider trading had been prosecuted before 1998 and 0 otherwise. Criminal Enforced is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if criminal sanctions have been successfully applied in an insider trading case. Private is the product of the right of private 
enforcement, a dummy that equals 1 where private prosecutions are allowed and 0 otherwise, and the law and order rating collected from International 
Country Risk Guide. Public is the mean of the supervisor attributes and investigative powers from La Porta et al. (2003).  
 
 
 
